Main Bout, Inc.,
Black Economic Power,
and Professional Boxing:
The Cancelled Muhammad Ali/
Ernie Terrell Fight

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There was a major drift toward economic nationalism in many areas of African-American life during the 1960s. Though often viewed as extreme at the time, scholars have come to place it within a constant ideological struggle between black nationalism and integration going back to the nineteenth century and later to the debates between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois at the turn of the twentieth century, and the work of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s. The issues involved all areas of black life, and Muhammad Ali’s embrace of black economic nationalism in the late 1960s demonstrates the saliency of nationalism as well as Ali’s role as a race leader.

At a press conference in January of 1966, Muhammad Ali announced that he had formed a new corporation, Main Bout, Inc., to manage the multi-million dollar promotional rights to his fights. "I am vitally interested in the company," he said, "and in seeing

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that it will be one in which Negroes are not used as fronts, but as stockholders, officers, and production and promotion agents.” Although racially integrated, Main Bout was led by the all-black Nation of Islam. Its rise to this position gave blacks control of boxing’s most valuable prize, the world heavyweight championship. This article examines how Main Bout embraced historical cooperative strategies of black economic empowerment endorsed by Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and Malcolm X. Muhammad Ali envisioned Main Bout as an economic network, a structure that would generate autonomy for black people.

From the beginning, Main Bout encountered resistance. Initially, it came from white sportswriters. But about a month after Main Bout’s formation, Ali’s draft status changed to 1-A, meaning he had become eligible for military service in the Vietnam War. He responded by publicly opposing the war. In response, politicians nationwide joined the press in attacking Main Bout. The political controversy surrounding Ali made it easier for Main Bout’s economic competitors—rival promoters, closed-circuit television theater chains, organized crime—to run the organization out of business. Money and politics were important elements of white resistance to Main Bout, but we must also consider the organization’s potency as a black power vehicle and its symbolic meaning to larger American publics.

Although Muhammad Ali’s conviction for draft evasion in June of 1967 would mean Main Bout’s demise, the company’s success in the face of corresponding political and economic attacks indicated the spirit of the Civil Rights movement and the tradition of cooperative black economic development. Why did Main Bout and Ali face massive resistance during this period? Certainly, Ali’s antiwar stance was vital to his potency as a symbol of the 1960s. This article recognizes, however, that Ali’s economic power as the world heavyweight champion was also essential to his significance as a race man. Ali demonstrated unprecedented professional, political, and personal autonomy for a black athlete by forming Main Bout and challenging the draft.

In their associations of Ali with the Civil Rights movement, scholars and journalists have emphasized Ali’s draft resistance while overlooking the importance of Main Bout to Ali’s vision as a race man. This focus on political protest over black economic nationalism parallels much of the scholarly literature and historical memory about the Civil Rights movement. Black leaders of the 1950s and 1960s often insisted that economic power was central to first-class citizenship, even as demonstrations and marches received the nation’s attention.

This article argues that Muhammad Ali’s formation of Main Bout, Inc. embraced both the tradition of black economic development and its contemporary manifestations within the Civil Rights and Black Power movements. The creation of Main Bout, the resistance faced by the organization, and Ali’s strategic counter-responses to his inquisitors during this period confirm Ali’s importance to the African-American freedom struggle. Within this context, Muhammad Ali must be treated as a race leader who was guided by a historical worldview that pursued black independence and freedom through economic empowerment.

In the United States, there has always been a strong element of economic nationalism in the programs of black leaders. At the turn of the twentieth century, Booker T. Washing-
ton modeled Tuskegee Institute as a center for black economic development and investment. Eschewing political protest in favor of business opportunities, Washington argued, "Brains, property, and character for the Negro will settle the question of civil rights." At its peak in the early 1920s, Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association and its allied corporations operated three grocery stores, two restaurants, a printing plant, a steam laundry, and a clothing manufacturing department; owned buildings and trucks; published a newspaper; and employed 1,000 black people in the United States. In 1964, Malcolm X asserted, "[T]he black man himself has to be made aware of the importance of going into business." By this period, economic ventures had made the Nation of Islam the largest and wealthiest black nationalist organization in the country, with impressive real estate holdings, scores of commercial ventures, and its own bank.

Throughout the Civil Rights movement, organizations like Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) merged political action with economic goals. According to movement veteran Julian Bond, the campaign had an economic underpinning from the beginning. "When [SCLC] people were boycotting the Montgomery buses," Bond noted, "they didn’t just want the front seats, they wanted bus driver jobs. When we [SNCC] were demonstrating at lunch counters in Atlanta, we didn’t just want to sit at the lunch counters, we wanted jobs in the store." In a May 1965 newspaper editorial, SNCC Chairman John Lewis wrote about the movement’s increasing focus on black economic power, "In 1960 we were demanding the right to eat a hamburger at any lunch counter. It took us three years to discover that we could not afford the hamburger and that we needed money." According to Lewis, political and economic power were inseparable. "Money means economic power," he continued. "In order to get and to maintain economic power we have to bargain. Bargaining means political power. So it took us three years to understand that political power insures the stability of economic power." Appearing on national television a year later, Lewis’ successor Stokely Carmichael also underscored the relationships between politics and economics. "As I see the problem in this country it is an economic problem in terms of black people being forced, being exploited," he said. "We are property-less people in this country. We are property-less and we have to seek to redress that and the only means open to us now are political means. So we grasp that political power now and then we see... how we can work with that political power to then achieve economic power." SNCC’s 1965 campaign to form an independent black political party in Lowndes County, Alabama, coincided with its proposal for a Poor People’s Land Cooperative in that area. As part of its backing of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s challenge of the white-supremacist Mississippi Democratic Party in 1964, SNCC proposed a Mississippi Farm League to "[g]ive Negroes economic, and therefore political power. A union of farmers will give Negroes economic autonomy. . . . As a strong organization it can give its members protection and effectively lobby for policies beneficial to them." Like SCLC and SNCC, Muhammad Ali also understood the importance of black economic control, and his formation of Main Bout had the potential to put increased economic power into the hands of blacks. At the press conference introducing Main Bout, Ali told reporters that the company would control the ancillary rights to his fights, starting
with a multi-million dollar March 29 match in Chicago against Ernie Terrell. Prior to 1966, Ali was managed by an all-white group of millionaires from his hometown called the Louisville Sponsoring Group. Most accounts indicate an amicable and profitable relationship between Ali and these backers. But Ali’s installation of Main Bout as his promotional team gave blacks unprecedented control of perhaps the most lucrative prize in sport, the ancillary rights to the heavyweight championship of the world. Main Bout’s control of these ancillary rights gave them access to the vast majority of revenues from Ali’s bouts. The ancillary promoter controlled the rights to live and delayed telecasts, radio broadcasts, fight films, and any further transmission or distribution of a bout as opposed to the local promoter, who produced the live event and controlled its on-site ticket sales. The major monies from big-time boxing matches during this period, including Ali’s, came from closed-circuit television. Because seating at and revenue from the hundreds of closed-circuit theaters nationwide greatly outnumbered that which could be generated at the arena where a given fight took place, such fights usually had closed-circuit television takes much larger than from other sources such as radio broadcasts or live gates.

Ali’s three previous bouts, the first of his championship career, were no exception. His last match before forming Main Bout, a November 1965 contest with former champion Floyd Patterson, grossed approximately $4 million. At least 210 closed-circuit television venues showed the match. Nearly 260 locations with a seating capacity of 1.1 million telecast Ali’s May 1965 bout with Sonny Liston, and gross receipts for the fight were believed to approach $4.3 million. Ali’s first title fight, against Liston in February of 1964, was shown in about 250 theaters to nearly 550,000 spectators, and promoters estimated that the bout’s gross receipts would be about $4 million. For all three of these fights, well over half of the total gross revenues came from closed-circuit television. By comparison, on-site ticket sales were only $300,000 for Ali’s fight with Patterson, $200,000 for the Liston rematch, and $400,000 for the first Liston bout. Ali’s purses also reflected the riches associated with this broadcast medium. He earned approximately $750,000 for the Patterson bout and $600,000 for each of the two Liston matches.

Main Bout had five stockholders. Herbert Muhammad, son of Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad, was its president. John Ali, the Nation of Islam’s national secretary, was Main Bout’s treasurer. Together, they controlled 50 percent of its stock and half of its board’s six votes. The closed-circuit television operator Michael Malitz and his attorney Bob Arum were Main Bout’s vice-president and secretary, holding 20 percent of Main Bout’s stock and one vote each. Jim Brown, the professional football player and Main Bout’s vice-president in charge of publicity, controlled one vote and 10 percent of the company. Malitz and Arum were Main Bout’s sole white members. They came up with the idea for the enterprise while promoting a 1965 fight in which Jim Brown served as their broadcaster. Malitz and Arum asked Brown to carry to the champion a proposal for a company that would allow Ali to control the finances for his fights and potentially increase black participation in their production. Brown passed the idea to Ali. Ali and the Nation of Islam approved the measure, and Main Bout was the result.

Like Muhammad Ali, Jim Brown emphasized Main Bout’s potential for increasing black economic power and control. He told a reporter, “Our goal is to use the money that we make—and hope to make in future ventures—to support the founding of business by
Negroes. At first, we'll have to count basically on small businesses.\textsuperscript{14} That summer, several months after Main Bout's formation, Brown retired from professional football and founded the National Negro Industrial and Economic Union. Although Main Bout was not formally connected to the National Negro Industrial and Economic Union, their goals were similar. Both wanted to increase black economic power in the United States. Muhammad Ali recognized this. In early 1967, he donated $10,000 to Brown's group.\textsuperscript{15}

White newspapermen constituted the first wave of opposition to Main Bout, as a number of reporters expressed fear over the Nation of Islam's ascent to power within professional boxing. Perhaps these reporters understood, like their contemporaries in the Civil Rights movement, that expanded economic power often brought with it influence in other areas of American life. Most were concerned with a black takeover of the sport, but others saw the Nation's rise within boxing as a portent to racial violence. Reminding readers that Elijah Muhammad's organization was "the group which advocates violence as the major weapon of racial war," syndicated \textit{New York Daily News} columnist and virulent Ali critic Gene Ward argued that the development of Main Bout could destroy professional boxing. "Any way one sizes up this take-over of the heavyweight title by the Black Muslims," he claimed, "the fight game is going to be the worse for it. This could be the death blow." A longtime Ali nemesis, the eminent sportswriter Jimmy Cannon wrote in his syndicated column that Main Bout's rise not only had great symbolic value but also put power into the hands of evildoers. "The fight racket has been turned into a crusade by the Muslims. Their great trophy is Clay," shrieked Cannon. Assessing Main Bout's initial promotional venture, he insisted, "Herbert Muhammad, who is Elijah's kid, is the president of the firm that controls the Clay-Ernie Terrell promotion in Chicago. It is more than a fight. This is a fete to celebrate a religion that throws hate at people." Other reporters less specifically described their fears. Nevertheless, their columns revealed their nervousness over the new order in professional boxing. Doug Gilbert, the \textit{Chicago's American} boxing writer, believed "that if the Muslims own Clay, and also own the television rights to all of his fights, they have what amounts to a hammerlock on all that's lucrative in boxing." Syndicated \textit{New York Herald-Tribune} writer Red Smith complained, "Except insofar as the Black Muslim leadership has a stake in the promotion, there is no good reason at present why the [Ali versus Terrell] match should not be accepted." Even the editorial boards of two Chicago newspapers, the \textit{Daily News} and the \textit{Tribune}, got into the act, urging Illinois Governor Otto Kerner to ban the upcoming bout.\textsuperscript{16}

Although Main Bout had critics within the black press, a number of writers welcomed its creation.\textsuperscript{17} Cal Jacox, the \textit{Norfolk Journal and Guide} sports editor and syndicated columnist, challenged the white press to cover Main Bout fairly. According to Jacox, "Boxing is in an uproar. It seems that pro football star Jim Brown has joined a group that will promote Cassius 'Muhammad Ali' Clay's title bout with Ernie Terrell and includes members of the Black Muslim sect among its officers; now, because of this alliance, the alarmist[s] are crying all over the place." Jacox assessed the fears of some white sportswriters, "They are saying that the Muslim philosophy will dominate Main Bout, Inc., and with this domination, they contend will come—via Cassius as the heavyweight champion—complete control of boxing." But to Jacox, this was not the issue. Main Bout's most important functions were outside professional boxing. "Jim Brown, in rebuttal, explained
that the sole purpose of the new organization is to use its profits to generate capital for Negro businessmen," he continued, "and that explanation is good enough for this corner. And, from here, it should probably be sufficient for the critics, who are way off base in castigating the project before they've given it a chance to reveal its program to the public." Two articles in the *Pittsburgh Courier* voiced similar support for Main Bout, adding that the organization was a necessary alternative to white rule of professional boxing, which had resulted in corruption and mob control of the sport.

In February of 1966, less than a month after Main Bout's formation, the United States Selective Service reclassified Muhammad Ali as draft-eligible for the Vietnam War. In 1960, at age eighteen, Ali had registered with Selective Service Local Board 47 in Louisville and in 1962 was classified as draft-eligible (1-A). In 1964, however, Ali failed the mental aptitude section of the induction exam. When asked to retest in front of Army psychologists, Ali again flunked. He was then reclassified as unqualified to serve (1-Y). In need of more soldiers for the Vietnam War, however, the Army lowered its mental aptitude requirement in early 1966, and Ali's score became a passing one. With members of Congress calling for his reclassification, Ali's local draft board reviewed his case in February. After the fighter's request for an appeal hearing was denied, he was again declared draft-eligible.

When reporters called Ali for comment, he signified his political and religious opposition to the Vietnam War. In a telephone interview with Tom Fitzpatrick of the *Chicago Daily News*, Ali claimed that he had seen "lots of whites burning their draft cards on television. If they are against the war, and even some congressmen are against the war," Ali asked, "why should we Muslims be for it?" According to Ali, the war violated the principles of the Nation of Islam. "Let me tell you, we Muslims are taught to defend ourselves when we are attacked," he added. "Those Vietcongs are not attacking me. All I know is that they are considered Asiatic black people and I don't have no fight with black people." Ali warned that his reclassification would incite the worldwide Muslim community: "I don't want to scare anybody about it, but there are millions of Muslims around the world watching what's happening to me." Ali also asserted that he had been singled out for unfair treatment: "I can't understand why, out of all the baseball players, all of the football players, all of the basketball players—they seek out me, who's the world's only heavyweight champion?" Ali's stand against the war produced a vicious backlash against him within the press and professional boxing.

White reporters nationwide dismissed Ali's stance as the result of fear and ignorance rather than principle. Elijah Muhammad, the Nation of Islam's leader, advised members of the organization to refuse military service in Vietnam. Not all Muslims refused military service, and some military people gravitated towards the Nation of Islam. But Ali's draft resistance conformed to the tradition established by Elijah Muhammad, who was imprisoned between 1942 and 1946 for his refusal to serve in World War II. Dick Young, the syndicated *New York Daily News* columnist and one of Ali's staunchest critics in the press, rejected this, asserting that there was "no evidence that [the Nation of Islam] is a pacifist organization, or that Cassius Clay is devoted to a policy of non-violence." *New York World-Telegram and Sun* scribe Jack Clary ("It's easy to see why Cassius [1-A] Clay flunked his Army mental") and Red Smith ("It has been established to the satisfaction of most that
Cassius Marcellus Clay is not a deep thinker”) claimed Ali was stupid. Gene Ward ("Cassius Clay is scared. There is a patina of panic glazing his eyes, as he talks compulsively in bursts of words") and the important New York Times sportswriter Arthur Daley ("[Ali is] panic-stricken at the thought of military service") felt that Ali was desperately afraid of combat duty.23

Another common supposition was that the Nation of Islam had manufactured Ali’s draft resistance only to save the upcoming fight with Terrell. After that, claimed these reporters, Ali would drop his shenanigans and join the Army.24 To save their profits, Jimmy Cannon assured readers, "The Black Muslims will shut up Clay." Once again, the editorial boards of Chicago newspapers voiced their antipathy to Ali and the Nation of Islam. Chicago’s American claimed to be "sorry for Cassius Clay. . . . [H]e is as innocent as a puppet compared to the gang of fanatics that now owns and operates him. In fact, he is a puppet." The Chicago Tribune asserted, "The Black Muslims have ordered [Ali] to appeal as a conscientious objector."25 These writers disputed the sincerity of Ali’s position and his understanding of the issues surrounding it.

In Chicago, Ali’s draft resistance and an escalating distrust of Main Bout unleashed furious attacks by local newspapers and politicians who called for the banning of his upcoming match with Ernie Terrell. Editorials in two local dailies called for cancellation of the fight, citing Ali’s anti-Vietnam stance and his new promotional scheme. Chicago’s American analyzed Ali’s reasons for disputing the draft and concluded that "none of them [were] particularly convincing." The Chicago Tribune found it "deplorable that so many Chicagoans are unwittingly encouraging [Ali] by their interest in a fight whose profits will go largely to the Black Muslims." Twenty state newspaper executives released a joint announcement criticizing Governor Otto Kerner and the Illinois State Athletic Commission for allowing the bout to be sanctioned. For several days, the Chicago Tribune devoted its front page to opponents of the fight. It interviewed disgusted American G.I.s in Vietnam, highlighting their anti-Ali rants. An area Veterans of Foreign Wars district, representing 14,500 former soldiers, passed a resolution urging Mayor Richard Daley and Governor Kerner to "intercede" and cancel the fight. Politicians and government appointees also registered their displeasure. State Representatives Clyde Choate and Arthur Gottschalk threatened to investigate the Illinois State Athletic Commission for approving the contest. State Senator Arthur Swanson called for Kerner to remove the match from Chicago. Charles Siragusa, the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission’s executive director, felt that "it is an insult to the people of this state to permit a man like Clay who swears allegiance to an admitted cult of violence to reap a harvest of cash from the very citizens he has insulted with his whining attempts to avoid the draft." Even State Auditor Michael J. Howlett hoped that the fight would be banned. Police Superintendent Orlando Wilson offered critical opposition, telling reporters, "My main concern is with the possibility of disorder arising from the bout, but I am also disturbed by the unpatriotic statements attributed to Clay." This intersection of professional duties and personal beliefs characterized official resistance to Ali. Daley leaned on the Illinois State Athletic Commission to "reconsider" the bout, claiming that Chicago "could well do without this fight." Kerner called Ali’s comments "disgusting and unpatriotic." Aided by the local press, white city and state politicians formed a nearly united front against the match within a matter of days.26
Local boxing promoters Ben Bentley and Irving Schoenwald worked to save the bout, concocting a plan in which Ali would apologize for his antiwar statements in exchange for permission to fight in Chicago. Although the Illinois State Athletic Commission, the state agency in charge of regulating boxing, had the power to cancel the match, it agreed to this compromise. This made sense because the Illinois State Athletic Commission would not simply cancel a fight it had already sanctioned. Nothing new had happened regarding the fight's promotion that would give it legal reason to do so. Governor Kerner also had a lot to lose were he to intervene and bar the match. Such action could be seen as racial discrimination. Bentley circulated rumors of a telephone call between himself and Ali during which the fighter rescinded his antiwar statements. Bentley told reporters, "since he [Ali] doesn't understand politics he's not going to discuss them any further, and he promised he's going to stick to fighting." Bentley also claimed that Ali had admitted, "I went off half-cocked and didn't know what I was saying." Illinois State Athletic Commission Chairman Joe Triner told the Associated Press, "Governor Kerner told me that he would be satisfied with an apology from Clay. So as of now, the fight hasn't been disapproved and it remains status quo." The United Press International quoted Ali: "If I knew everything I had said on politics would have been taken that seriously . . . I never would have opened my mouth." Lester Bromberg of the New York World-Telegram and Sun detailed Ali's "newly-discovered humility" and reported the champion's assertion, "I ain't no authority on Vietnam. I ain't no leader and no preacher." With this narrative established, the Illinois State Athletic Commission announced that they would reconvene to hear Ali's apology for his "unpatriotic remarks."27

This scheme reflected the overriding feeling that Ali's draft resistance was insincere and offered him the chance to verify such speculation. If he were to go back on his beliefs, he could pursue his career without censure. White sportswriters, many of whom had already declared the folly of Ali's position, predicted that he would apologize to save the fight. They assumed that boxing, and the paydays that accompanied it, were more important to the champion than his antiwar stand. They wrote that he would withdraw from political matters in the future and that he had learned his lesson. These reporters also claimed that Ali would skip the Nation of Islam's Savior's Day Convention as a way of displaying this transformation.28 Such predictions ignored Miami Herald reporter Pat Putnam's interview with the champion. Ali told Putnam that the reports were "not true. I'll be there. I've got to be there, I've got to. I'm going."

Unlike the white press, Muhammad Speaks, the Nation of Islam's official newspaper, reported that Ali had come to Chicago not only to attend the Illinois State Athletic Commission hearing but also to appear at the Savior's Day Convention, announcing that the champion "made preparations to fly into Chicago for a two-purpose visit, one of which included a meeting with the Illinois [State] Athletic Commission, the other with his leader and teacher, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad, during Savior's Day Convention."30 His comments to Putnam notwithstanding, Ali agreed to the scheme, refusing further comment about the war until the hearing. He flew from his training camp in Miami to Chicago to testify. Promoter Bentley greeted the champion at the airport and plastered a piece of tape across his lips. Ali went along with the gag, responding to any questions by mumbling and pointing to his mouth.31

Before the Illinois State Athletic Commission, Ali refused to apologize. The hearing
was a national event; fifty reporters, twenty-five lawyers, six state troopers, and several
government officials packed the Illinois State Athletic Commission’s Chicago office to
hear Ali testify. The commission asked him if he were sorry for his antiwar comments. Ali
answered, "I’m not apologizing for any remarks that were in the newspapers. I will take
that up with government officials and officials of the draft board at the proper time." Ali
expressed regrets, but not for his beliefs. He instead apologized "to the people who may be
hurt financially. I am sorry I put the commission and Governor Kerner on the spot with
my remarks. I did not mean to hurt the children and the sons of persons who are dying in
Vietnam." Stunned, Triner asked Ali, "I want to know if you are apologizing to the people
of the state of Illinois for the unpatriotic remarks you made." Ali insisted, "I’m not apolo-
gizing for anything like that because I don’t have to."

To make himself clear, he added,

"I’m not here to make a showdown plea. I’m not here to apologize in any way that the press
has predicted I would apologize." Flabbergasted by Ali’s defiance, the Illinois State Ath-
etic Commission adjourned the meeting and contemplated its next move.

About a half-hour after the hearing, Illinois Attorney General William Clark declared
the match illegal. Citing possible inconsistencies in the licensing procedures for Ali and
Terrell and a widely ignored rule that any corporation promoting a boxing or wrestling
event had to have at least fifty people in it, Clark advised the Illinois State Athletic Com-
mission to "adjourn their meeting and to so advise the participants" that their promotion
was finished in Chicago. While Clark’s legal claims were legitimate, such rules had
always been loosely enforced, if not ignored. Almost certainly, Ali’s draft resistance brought
increased scrutiny over the licensing and promotion of his fight with Terrell. Mayor Daley
backed the decision: "The attorney general has issued an opinion holding the fight illegal.
All state officials are bound by the opinion of the attorney general. It seems to me the
commission has no other choice but to follow the opinion." The Illinois State Athletic
Commission acquiesced and cancelled the match. The Chicago Tribune praised Daley,
Kerner, and Clark for intervening.

Refusing to apologize reinforced Ali’s defiance and engendered nationwide opposi-
tion to his upcoming title fight with Terrell. Unwelcome in Chicago, Main Bout shopped
the contest around the United States with little success. In each city, local boxing people
greeted Main Bout with interest, but state and local government officials rejected them.
Main Bout’s Bob Arum explained, "I got calls from promoters all over the country want-
ing to hold the fight, even from Huron, S.D." However, said Arum, "the day after a
promoter would call me, the governor of his state or the mayor would announce there’d be
no Clay fight in his town or state." Promoters in Louisville, for example, completed nego-
tiations with Main Bout and the Kentucky State Athletic Commission agreed to sanction
the bout. Influenced by local veterans groups, however, members of the Kentucky State
Senate announced the next day that they would block the fight. The Kentucky State Sen-
ate also passed a resolution urging Ali to join the Army, and State Senator William L.
Sullivan asked Ali to "abandon his reprehensible efforts to avoid duty in the country which
afforded him the opportunity to achieve eminence." In Pittsburgh, promoters inquired
about hosting the match. The next day, Pennsylvania legislators moved to bar it. After local
promoters and the Maine State Athletic Commission announced their interest in sponsor-
ing the contest, Governor John Reed rebuffed them. Promoters in South Dakota, Rhode
Island, Oklahoma, and Missouri also asked about holding the bout in their states but were blocked. The pattern was clear: as soon as the news broke that area boxing people were interested in the fight, local or state officials opposed them. With the contest less than a month away, Main Bout had yet to secure a site. At the Savior’s Day Convention, which the champion attended, Elijah Muhammad blasted the government’s war policy and the racist singling out of Ali, but some white sportswriters denied that prejudice had anything to do with the criticism of Ali. Before 4,000 people, Muhammad asserted that whites only wanted Ali for service after “he entered the army of the Lord [the Nation of Islam].” He also claimed that white politicians had enforced an official policy that “[t]he Negro should go to Vietnam and kill other Negroes while our sons stay home and go to colleges and universities.” David Condon of the Chicago Tribune denied that racial or religious discrimination had anything to do with Ali’s reclassification. Furthermore, he was appalled that “some of Champion Cassius Clay’s admirers have bleated that the opposition to this fight is because it involves a great colored title holder. These admirers holler ‘hate’ and ‘prejudice.’” To Condon, it was almost impossible for sportswriters to be racist. “A person would have to be naive, indeed, to believe that sports writers were becoming prejudiced at such a late date,” he claimed. “No man of prejudice can be a sports writer today. The majority of the great athletes are colored men, and the sports writers associate with them daily.”

Meanwhile, Main Bout shopped the match around Canada. This was a risky move because it assumed that Ali’s draft board would give him permission to leave the country. Fortunately, the Louisville Draft Board voted unanimously to let Ali perform in Canada because of its proximity to the United States and because the champion promised them that his stay there would be brief. The Louisville Draft Board ordered Ali to return to the United States by April 7 or face desertion charges.

The same pattern developed in Canada as in the United States. Promoters in Montreal, Sorrels, Edmonton, and Verdun talked with Main Bout, but their city governments blocked the fight in opposition to Ali’s antiwar stance. Finally, the Ontario Minister of Labor agreed to host the contest. Even in Toronto, however, the fight stirred controversy. The management of Maple Leaf Gardens, where the bout would be held, became embroiled in a bitter struggle. Hockey legend Conn Smythe, the founder of the Toronto Maple Leafs franchise, resigned his position as the arena’s director in protest.

Almost immediately after Toronto approved the contest, Ernie Terrell withdrew citing financial considerations, forcing Main Bout to find a substitute opponent, Canadian heavyweight George Chuvalo. Sportswriters further hurt Main Bout’s cause by labeling the fight a mismatch. Chuvalo was not as attractive an opponent as Terrell from a boxing standpoint. He had lost his previous bout to an unranked fighter. Therefore, it was unsurprising that sportswriters believed the contest to be uncompetitive. Despite this, it is unlikely that the substitution of Chuvalo per se would make the promotion unprofitable. First, the popular Chuvalo’s fighting in his hometown for the championship would probably increase the live gate and Canadian closed-circuit television sales. Second, Chuvalo’s whiteness was probably attractive to customers, black and white, who saw boxing as racial theater. Third, Chuvalo had previously fought in matches that had done well financially. His February 1965 bout with Floyd Patterson at Madison Square Garden drew 19,000
fans paying $165,000. Sixty-four closed-circuit television venues with a seating capacity of 300,000 had screened the bout.  

Nevertheless, the promotion had gone bust. A month earlier, the Associated Press had predicted gross receipts of over $4 million and a minimum purse of $450,000 for Ali. This was an excellent guarantee for a fight against Terrell, who was not as well known as Floyd Patterson or Sonny Liston. If the fight did better than expected, Ali’s share would have been larger. The day after Main Bout announced that they had signed Chuvalo, however, the Associated Press reported that the fight’s gross would be approximately $500,000. Although there had been radio broadcasts of all of Ali’s previous title matches, only a handful of the fight’s forty-two sponsors agreed to support the bout. The radio broadcast had to be cancelled.

Critics of Main Bout, Ali, and the Nation of Islam proposed a boycott of the closed-circuit broadcast. In Miami, a 2,700-member American Legion post said that it would picket any theater that showed the fight. No Miami sites broadcast Ali versus Chuvalo. Other than a pair of demonstrators in Fort Worth and an unfounded bomb scare in Cleveland, however, the oft-threatened protests against operators showing the match did not materialize. Some sportswriters asked readers to stay away from the bout. Eddie Muller, the San Francisco Examiner’s boxing writer, chastised any theater operators who “might take it upon themselves to accept the TV firm’s promotion and make a quick dollar.” Referring to a proposed local boycott of the fight, Muller commented, “If every state follows California’s action perhaps it’ll be a complete nationwide blackout, which is as it should be.”

The most crippling blow to the promotion, by far, was its abandonment by closed-circuit television theater chains. Main Bout had contracted 280 North American closed-circuit television venues to show the Terrell fight, but only thirty-two sites ended up showing the match against Chuvalo. Several cities that normally hosted Ali title fights in at least one area venue, including Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Kansas City, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, did not screen the bout. California’s two biggest boxing promoters, Don Chargin and Aileen Eaton, met on March 6 and agreed to block the broadcast in their state. They announced that they would lobby theater owners in an effort to make sure that no venues in California showed the March 29 contest “in deference to the many families that have loved ones fighting and dying in Vietnam.” When Main Bout approached Ray Syufy, owner of twenty-one drive-in theaters in Northern California, to televise the match, it was turned down, although Syufy admitted that the company had made him a “lucrative offer.” In total, the fight was shown in only two California venues, both of them independent theaters. By contrast, Ali’s previous bout against Floyd Patterson was shown in thirteen Los Angeles area theaters alone. In New York, seven Loews’ theaters withdrew 13,000 seats from the closed-circuit pool. Ernie Emerling, the firm’s public relations vice-president claimed, “Too much silly-shallying over the site didn’t leave us enough time to print tickets and advertise; we should have had six-to-eight weeks.” Later, New York’s RKO theater chain canceled their offer to show the fight in their ten area venues. While twenty-five New York City venues with a seating capacity of 80,000 had shown Ali versus Patterson, only five New York City theaters with a seating capacity of 11,000 hosted Ali versus Chuvalo. In Chicago, Ed Seguin, representing the Balaban and Katz chain of theaters, reported that
his firm would not show the fight "because of all the uncertainty over where, and whether, it was coming off." Both the B&K and Warner theater chains canceled their arrangements with Main Bout nationwide.53

At this time, Main Bout needed cooperation from these chains because most of the theaters equipped to show fights belonged to motion picture concerns like Loews' and RKO. There were few independent operators capable of profiting from closed-circuit telecasts due to spatial and technical limitations. For example, when two locals produced a broadcast in Jacksonville of Ali's first fight with Sonny Liston, their fees and costs were difficult to overcome. The Jacksonville Coliseum had about 9,000 seats. The half-full arena produced about $17,300 in ticket sales. Federal and state taxes were about $1,000. Promoters had to pay the ancillary promoter, Theater Network Television, 55 percent of their gross receipts after taxes ($9,000). Although the Jacksonville Coliseum was equipped with a $675 RCA projector, Theater Network Television insisted that the promoters rent a state-of-the-art Eidophor projector to show the bout ($2,600). Theater Network Television owned the American rights to the Eidophor. Rental of the Jacksonville Coliseum cost $1,600. The promoters installed a phone loop that connected the fight's broadcast signal to the theater ($550). Insurance cost $300 and advertising was $750. The promoters also had to hire security, printers, ushers, a sound engineer, and ticket takers ($1000). The Jacksonville promoters netted less than $500 for their enterprise. Theater Network Television probably made ten times this amount on the venture.54 Main Bout hoped to do similarly well but could only do so with the cooperation of properly equipped theater chains. Eventually, Main Bout hoped to encourage independent, black-owned theaters to get involved in Ali's fights, perhaps by lowering its percentage of the take.

The Ali-Chuvalo fight was financially disastrous, although fans saw an excellent boxing match that Ali won by fifteen-round unanimous decision.55 The closed-circuit telecast sold about 46,000 tickets for $110,000. This gross take was 20-to-40 times below closed-circuit revenues from each of Ali's three previous championship fights. The $150,000 on-site, live gate was also lower than for each of Ali's previous title bouts. Furthermore, Ali's $60,000 purse was approximately a tenth of those for each of his three previous bouts and at least three times less than for any fight of his championship career. The Associated Press summarized, "Theater-television of last night's Cassius Clay-George Chuvalo heavyweight title fight proved a resounding dud, as expected." Eddie Muller crowed, "Forming the Main Bout, Inc. organization was a costly mistake. Whoever put money into the firm must wind up broke. There's no way, as far as we can see, of the organization recouping."56 Michael Malitz of Main Bout disputed this claim, telling reporters that Main Bout "made enough to pay the bills" and break even. Nevertheless, even Malitz had to admit that his company was "grossly underpaid for the time and effort."57 The fiasco illustrated Main Bout's lack of control over the terms of Ali's fights. The organization would have to weigh its next move carefully if it, and Ali's career, were to survive.

Several white sportswriters and at least one black reporter blamed Main Bout's incompetence for the promotion's collapse. Bob Stewart of the New York World-Telegram and Sun teased, "It all seemed so simple. You just formed a quickie corporation and put on a title fight." Eddie Muller called Main Bout a "fly-by-night enterprise which now louse[s] up the horizon." The syndicated Los Angeles Times reporter and Ali basher Jim Murray claimed,
"Clay’s corporation, which ironically, calls itself "Main Bout, Inc." and is run by a football player and a couple of guys whose sole qualification is they once subscribed to the Police Gazette." One of Ali’s few consistent critics within the black press, A.S. "Doc" Young of the New York Amsterdam News, insisted, "It was the stupidest sort of publicity for the Black Muslims to publicize their association with Main Bout, Inc." Other sportswriters compared Main Bout unfavorably to the Louisville Sponsoring Group.

A number of black observers disagreed and identified racism and a possible criminal conspiracy as reasons for the financial failure of the Ali-Chuvalo fight. "There are some reports of possible court action or civil rights agencies may be looking into the cancellations of the closed circuit television showings to ascertain if there was any overt racial discrimination involved," according to Clarence Matthews of the Louisville Defender. "What columnists have tried to do is thwart the Black Muslims through castigation of Clay," Marion Jackson wrote in the Atlanta Daily World. "It seems as though the Black Muslims for the first time [have] projected a Negro group—Main Bout, Inc., in control of a nationwide closed circuit telecast." Muhammad Speaks accused white reporters of hiding their racism through so-called patriotic attacks on Ali. "Outbursts over [Ali’s] military draft status were [a] means of killing two birds with one red, white, and blue stone" and an "attempt to smear" Main Bout, according to the newspaper. The most strident response came from Moses Newson of the Baltimore Afro-American. Newson praised Main Bout for surviving "in face of the most vicious and concentrated 'kill them off' campaign ever joined in by the press, the Mafia, and politicians." He asserted that white "reporters, broadcasters, and others who tried to kill the fight scribbled and spouted bitter reams to a degree that they actually need to offer something more lest they themselves might be thought part of an unholy alliance that includes racists, hypocrites, and mobsters." On Capitol Hill, Main Bout’s Jim Brown, in a press conference with Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, contended, "The ostensible reason" for the boycott "is because of Clay’s so-called unpatriotic remarks about the draft, but that’s just an excuse [to destroy Main Bout]." Powell vowed to have the U.S. Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigate the situation, although it is unclear whether or not he did so.

Although Main Bout had complained as early as January that the mob was sabotaging their promotion, white sportswriters denied such a conspiracy. Even Robert Lipsyte of the New York Times, one of Ali’s strongest supporters in the white press, called such a possibility "imaginative" because it suggested "an improbable plot of enormous complexity." Jack Berry of the Detroit Free Press asserted that such a plot was "not evident here. There’s only one difficulty in this whole affair and the name is Cassius Clay. He brought it all on himself." Jimmy Cannon denied that racism fueled anti-Main Bout sentiment but admitted that organized crime resented Main Bout’s entry into boxing. "The fight mob detests Clay. Their revulsion isn’t instigated by race," wrote Cannon in his syndicated column. "They want Chuvalo to beat him because Clay has made the greatest prize in sports worthless. This isn’t temporary. He is in trouble for a long while."

The Federal Bureau of Investigation looked into the boycott. It suspected that Terrell withdrew not only because of financial concerns but also because of death threats to him and his manager Bernard Glickman by Chicago underworld figures who would
no longer profit if the bout were moved to Canada.\textsuperscript{62} The FBI inquiry, however, proved inconclusive, and no further federal investigation of the fight took place.\textsuperscript{63} The \textit{Pittsburgh Courier} sighed, "[A]s usual, the casting of light on supported underworld control of boxing still remains unfulfilled."\textsuperscript{64}

In response to the FBI investigation, some members of the white press acknowledged the possibility of collusion to eliminate Main Bout and Ali from boxing. The difficulties surrounding Main Bout's initial closed-circuit venture were "apparently an outgrowth of boxing's current scramble for position in a future made uncertain by the troubles of Cassius Clay," wrote Robert Lipsyte. "To the underworld, the new organization meant only that 'a rival gang' had moved in and was in a position to 'ace them out' by not dealing with 'trusted' closed circuit television operators or exhibitors as well as the other businessmen who normally get pay days from a title fight." Similarly, the United Press International reported, "New York Mafia interests were enraged at the attempt of the Muslims to take over closed circuit television rights and other revenues from professional boxing through Main Bout, Inc."\textsuperscript{65}

Realizing that he might not be able to fight under Main Bout at home, Ali considered matches outside the United States. At first, he was nervous about this possibility. "They want to stop me from fighting. They done run me out of the country. . . .This [the Chuvalo match] could be my last fight," the champion told Phil Pepe of the \textit{New York World-Telegram and Sun}. He revealed to syndicated \textit{New York Post} columnist Milton Gross, "I don't want to go [abroad]. I want to defend my title here somewhere or even in a phone booth or in a barge at sea."\textsuperscript{66} By the end of March, however, Ali had reconciled his doubts. "I'm not fighting for money," he said, "but for the freedom of American black people to speak their minds."\textsuperscript{67} To a Louisville reporter, he admitted that he would like to fight in the United States, "But they can put it in England, Nigeria, France, or Rome if they want to. I don't care about the money. It's a world title I got, not a U.S.A. title, and it can be defended anywhere in the world." During an interview with Larry Merchant of the \textit{Philadelphia Daily News}, Ali fanned himself with a replica passport and insisted that he would fight wherever he would be allowed.\textsuperscript{68} Ali's most eloquent expression of this outlook was recorded by Robert Lipsyte. "Boxing is nothing, just satisfying some bloodthirsty people. I'm no longer Cassius Clay, a Negro from Kentucky. I belong to the world, the black world. I'll always have a home in Pakistan, in Algeria, in Ethiopia. This is more than money," he said.\textsuperscript{69} "I'm not disturbed and nervous. Why should I be? In a few hours I could fly to another country, in the East, in Africa, where people love me. Millions, all over the world want to see me. Why should I worry about losing a few dollars." The champion concluded, "I'm not going to sell my manhood for a few dollars, or a smile. I'd rather be poor and free than rich and a slave."\textsuperscript{70} Ali's comments foreshadowed his and Main Bout's decision to take his next three matches to Europe, where there had not been a world heavyweight championship contest in more than thirty years. The three European fights earned Ali purses far more lucrative than he had received for the match in Canada with Chuvalo and reestablished him as the top drawing power in boxing.

Ali fought in May against Britain's Henry Cooper for a $350,000 purse, the first world heavyweight title fight in England since 1908. For the rights to the bout with Cooper, ABC paid Main Bout $75,000. Mexican and Canadian television stations that picked
up the signal also had to pay Main Bout a fee. Although smaller than successful U.S.
closed-circuit telecasts, this sum was comparable to the $110,000 grossed by the broadcast
of Ali versus Chuvalo. Equally important, the deal gave Main Bout and Ali increased
independence from oppositional forces in the United States. Primarily through a huge on-
site crowd and a successful British closed-circuit telecast, the Cooper fight raked in money.
About 46,000 fans packed Arsenal Stadium. The $560,000 live gate was almost four times
greater than that of the Chuvalo fight and set a British boxing record. Sixteen English
closed-circuit theaters generated approximately 40,000 ticket sales and $280,000 in rev-
ues. In all, the fight grossed nearly $1.5 million.71

Ali fought again in England in August, garnering a $300,000 purse for his match
against Brian London. Main Bout received fees in exchange for the European and foreign
rights to the contest while Ali received a $270,000 minimum guarantee plus a share of the
ancillary receipts. For the live North American television rights, ABC paid Main Bout
$200,000. Ten thousand people paid to see the London fight, which took in $150,000 on-
site. Closed-circuit returns neared $165,000.72 Even Gene Ward had to admit, "In both of
these European ventures, Clay will earn more than he ever could have in the United States,
where his opposition to the draft has left him an unpopular figure."73

In September, he defended his title against Karl Mildenberger in Germany, where
there had never been a world heavyweight championship fight, for a $300,000 purse.
Once again, ABC agreed to pay Main Bout $200,000 for the live television rights to the
match. Forty thousand fans paid $500,000 on-site to see it in person. Although there was
no closed-circuit television broadcast, other ancillary revenues (not including Main Bout’s
$200,000 deal with ABC) brought $250,000.74

In these three cases, rather than trying to work with a corrupt and hostile closed-
circuit television industry at home, Main Bout instead signed to show the bouts live on
free television in the United States (made possible by the Early Bird Satellite’s successful
launch a year earlier), on closed-circuit television in Europe, and on the radio in Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia. Main Bout and Ali’s independence from the established network of
promoters in the United States allowed their return to North America for three fights in
late 1966 and early 1967 under favorable promotional terms. They earned millions of
dollars without relinquishing any control of their prized championship commodity, and
Ali became the most active heavyweight champion since Joe Louis. Even against over-
matched and relatively unknown opposition, Ali was making good money.

Muhammad Ali’s bout with Cleveland Williams in November of 1966 did very well,
thanks to a successful closed-circuit broadcast and Ali’s popularity among blacks. Thirty-
five thousand fans watched the contest at the Houston Astrodome, paying $460,000 and
breaking the American indoor attendance record for boxing. One hundred twenty-five
U.S. closed-circuit television venues with a total seating capacity of 500,000 showed the
match. In a number of cities, Main Bout worked with previously uncooperative theater
chains. Twenty-four New York closed-circuit locations had a seating capacity of 68,000,
with tickets priced between $5 and $10 each. Loew’s and RKO, theater chains that had
refused to show Ali-Chuvalo, hosted the fight. In New Jersey, three previously unco opera-
tive Warner’s theaters also telecast the match. Six Northern California venues showed the
fight, and at least one did superb business. The Warfield Theater in San Francisco sold
2,000 of 2,600 available seats for the match. Jack Fiske of the San Francisco Chronicle observed, "The theater audience was at least one-fourth Negro, perhaps the largest turnout for any Clay fight I recall." At least fourteen Los Angeles area venues screened Ali-Williams; only two venues in California had shown Ali-Chuvalo. Chicago’s B&K movie theater chain, which had declined to telescast Ali-Chuvalo, showed a feature movie before broadcasting to patrons the Ali-Williams fight. In total, seven Chicago area venues hosted the match. Leo Brown, the manager of the State-Lake movie theater, told the Chicago Tribune, "It wasn't a full house, but a good house." The Tribune reporter noted, "an unusually large number of Negro fans paid $7.50 for reserved seats." Total closed-circuit receipts probably topped $1,000,000. Main Bout also arranged for telescasts and films in forty-two countries. It sold live television rights to Mexican and Canadian stations and delayed privileges to ABC. There was also a live U.S. radio broadcast of the match, which brought in an additional $100,000. Main Bout pocketed 32.5 percent of the ancillary gross. Ali's purse probably exceeded $750,000.75

In February of 1967, Ali's long-awaited match with Ernie Terrell also proved lucrative. Thirty-seven thousand fans at the Astrodome paid $400,000 on-site. One hundred seventy-eight North American closed-circuit venues took in approximately $1,000,000. Main Bout pocketed 30 percent of the ancillaries. Ali's purse approached $1,000,000. At Madison Square Garden, one of eleven New York City venues to show the bout, 5,500 (of a possible 10,000) fans paid between $7.50 and $10, despite inclement weather. Once again, Main Bout agreed to terms with previously uncooperative closed-circuit chains. In total, there were twenty-five New York Tri-State area venues with a seating capacity of 95,000, not including a pay-per-view home TV arrangement in Hartford. Newark's Branford Theater, one of eight New Jersey venues, sold out. At least twelve Los Angeles area venues broadcast the bout. There was also a live U.S. radio broadcast.76

Ali's March 1967 contest with Zora Folley was not as big as the other two matches, but it yielded a solid $265,000 purse for Ali. The match was Madison Square Garden's first world heavyweight title bout in over fifteen years, but terrible weather in New York limited the crowd to 14,000. They paid $244,000, an arena record, to see it in person. RKO Pictures purchased the worldwide rights to the match from Main Bout for $175,000 and made Ali versus Folley the first ever heavyweight championship fight shown live on U.S. home television during prime time. Main Bout made no profit from the fight and did not promote it. The organization merely to broker the worldwide rights to RKO. Main Bout paid Ali $150,000 and Folley $25,000 of the fee it received. Ali also earned about 50 percent of the live gate.77

Following these successes, Main Bout arranged for a rematch between Ali and Floyd Patterson before the champion's May induction date. The Nevada State Athletic Commission agreed to sanction the April 25 bout in Las Vegas. Main Bout announced that it would be broadcast on closed-circuit television in the United States and beamed via satellite to Japan and Europe. Contracts called for Ali to receive $225,000. By April 11, according to Michael Malitz, Main Bout had contracted eighty-five venues in the United States and a "large number of foreign outlets," to show the bout. He estimated that Main Bout had already received $150,000 in fees.78

As in Chicago a year earlier, however, an anti-Ali backlash ensued, and the fight never took place. The press and government officials called for the cancellation of the match.
Jimmy Cannon labeled the bout a "sanctioned atrocity." Las Vegas Sheriff Ralph Lamb warned local promoters that "they will not receive police protection from my department this time. Why should I risk some fine men getting hurt when the only ones who will profit from this fiasco will be the private promoters of the fight?" On April 11, Nevada Governor Paul Laxalt requested that the Nevada State Athletic Commission cancel the fight, which it did. "It would give Nevada a black eye," claimed Laxalt. Main Bout then shifted its attention to Pittsburgh. The Pennsylvania State Athletic Commission agreed to sanction the match. Laxalt called Pennsylvania Governor Raymond Shafer and asked him to block it, which Shafer did. New York was mentioned as a possible site. When asked about the fight, New York State Athletic Commissioner Edwin Dooley ended such speculation: "We have a reciprocity agreement with both the Nevada and Pennsylvania Commissions. They abide by our rulings and we abide by theirs." Although New Mexico Governor David Cargo offered Albuquerque as a last-minute site, Main Bout had run out of time. They risked another Toronto-type flop with just two weeks remaining before Ali's induction ceremony. Main Bout threw in the towel. Malitz told a reporter, "Once Pittsburgh was a dead issue, I felt it was all over." With his career stalled, Ali turned his attention to his trial.

Muhammad Ali's conviction on draft evasion charges in June of 1967 ended Main Bout's run after only seventeen months and seven fights, and it is difficult to assess the company's impact on black economic power. Main Bout's economic goals seem to have been threefold: 1) negotiate good purses for Ali; 2) make money for its shareholders; 3) create wealth and employment for blacks. It would appear they accomplished the first two goals but not the third. Main Bout's early demise, however, makes it impossible to know if it would have become a black economic institution capable of making money and creating jobs for substantial numbers of African Americans.

Ultimately, Main Bout's collapse stemmed from its lack of political power rather than from economic pressure. State athletic commissions nationwide unanimously refused to license Ali immediately following his indictment in May of 1967. If any state athletic commission had sanctioned an Ali fight, he would have fought there. Following his conviction, Ali stayed out of prison on appeal, but his passport was invalidated, eliminating his chances of fighting abroad. Realizing Ali was finished, Arum, Malitz, and Brown left Main Bout to form their own company, Sports Action, Inc., which would promote the tournament designed to replace Ali as heavyweight champion. The Nation of Islam and Ali were frozen out of professional boxing. For the next three-and-a-half years, Ali did not fight professionally. Nevertheless, Main Bout's temporary success in the face of tremendous opposition was a symbolic victory for blacks. Like Ali and his contemporaries in the Civil Rights movement, the company faced challenges without compromising its principles. The story of Main Bout, Inc. reminds us how cultural sites, in this case professional boxing, can become key arenas for larger political and economic struggle.

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6 Author interview with Julian Bond, 18 March 2002, notes in possession of author.


8 Transcript of Carmichael's June 19, 1966 appearance on CBS's "Face the Nation" appears in SNCC Papers, subgroup A, series I, reel 2, item 58.

9 SNCC Papers, subgroup A, series I, reel 2, item 52.

10 Ibid., appendix A, reel 70, item 534A, 7 August 1964.

11 Thomas Hauser, who became an Ali spokesman during the 1990s and whose biography of the boxer helped spur that decade's Ali renaissance, called Ali's contract with the Louisville Sponsoring Group "fair and generous for its time." Thomas Hauser, Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times (New York: Touchstone, 1991), 30. Claude Lewis' influential early biography commented, "There are eleven sponsors in the group, and at a time when the boxing world is beclouded by underworld dickering, misappropriated funds, government investigation, and a general sorrowful malaise, they present an uplifting sight...Not only does their private wealth insure Clay that he will never end up broke through any fault of theirs, but they surround him with a substantial moral and ethical environment, a rare commodity in boxing these days." Claude Lewis, Cassius Clay (New York: MacFadden-Bartell Books, 1965), 39.


13 Although Main Bout had only five members the organization was split into six voting shares in order to give the Nation of Islam 50 percent control. Jimmy Cannon, "Theater TV, the Muslims...and Jim Brown," Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 10 January 1966, sec. C, p. 2; Hauser, Muhammad Ali, 151-152; Robert Lipsyte, "Clay's Main Bout, Inc., Seen Final Step in a Project to Bolster Negro Business," New York Times, 9 January 1966, sec. 5, p. 4; George Vass, "TV Firm Dictated Date of Title Bout," Chicago Daily News, 28 January 1966, p. 22.
14 Quoted in Vass, "TV Firm Dictated Date."


18 Cal Jacox, "From the Sidelines," Cleveland Call and Post, 22 January 1966, p. 22.


34Quoted in "Attorney General Clark's Statement," Chicago's American, 25 February 1966, p. 25. Bentley and Schoenwald were the only members of the National Sports Promotion Corporation that promoted the live, on-site event. According to Clark, the licensing problems were: Ali didn’t file a certificate of a resident physician with his license reapplication; Ali answered a "moral character" question insufficiently; Ali failed to include his proper ring record in the license reapplication; and that he signed the application "Muhammad Ali" instead of "Cassius Clay." Clark also cited Terrell for failing to file a physician’s certificate. Jesse Abramson, "The Championship Fight Almost Nobody Wants," New York Herald-Tribune, 2 March 1966, p. 27.

35Quoted in Doug Gilbert, "Clay Title Fight on Ropes Here, Pittsburgh Next?" Chicago's American, 26 February 1966, sec. 1, p. 1.


Ernie Emerling and Ed Seguin quoted in Lester Bromberg, "Only 1 Local Theater Chain Has Clay TV," *New York World-Telegram and Sun*, 9 March 1966, p. 34; Paul Weisman, "Fight Facts . . . or


57 Quoted in Dave Brady, "Home TV Carries Clay-Cooper Fight," Washington Post, 27 April 1966, sec. C, p. 3. If Malitz’s claim was accurate, the profit margin for closed-circuit television was enormous.


62 In a July 2002 interview with the author, Terrell denied being threatened by gangsters and claimed that Glickman had no mob ties. Terrell also denied talking to the FBI about his withdrawal from the Ali fight.

63 The FBI, with help from the U.S. Department of Justice (it is unclear if they were responding to Powell’s request), investigated the promotion and announced that it would hold grand jury hearings into death threats against Terrell. It also probed allegations that mobsters had threatened to kill Glickman for compromising the chances of a match between Ali and Terrell in New York, where the fight was originally scheduled to take place before being bumped to Chicago. The FBI also claimed that Chicago gangsters had threatened to murder Terrell if he faced Ali in Toronto. In all, eleven witnesses from the often-interrelated worlds of organized crime and professional boxing were on the docket. They were: Glickman; Irving Schoenwald; Bob Arum; Teddy Brenner and Harry Markson, who together ran Madison Square Garden’s boxing division; Joseph Glaser, a New York theatrical agent and boxing manager; Julius Isaacson, Terrell’s former manager and a New York underworld associate; Anthony Accardo, the Chicago crime syndicate’s “Godfather”; Felix Alderisio, Accardo’s second-in-command; Gus Alex, the boss of the Chicago crime syndicate’s gambling operations; and Gus Zapas, a top Chicago aide to labor leader Jimmy Hoffa. The government wanted to know if Accardo, Alderisio, Alex, Zapas, and perhaps some of their New York affiliates had violated federal gambling and racketeering laws in their attempt to


